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The protection of internal security and constitutional order
as exemplified by the tasks and activity of the Internal
Security Agency – a critical analysis of de lege lata and
de lege ferenda regulations
Abstract: The main objective of the paper is to present the issues of the protection of internal security
and constitutional order in view of the tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency in Poland. The
author of the text seeks answers to the following questions. (1) To what extent does the lack of clear-cut
frames for the ISA’s activity influence the instrumental use of this agency? (2) Do over-generalised legal
regulations on the ISA’s activities lead to poorer efficiency of this agency’s operations? (3) Does faulty
regulation related to the ISA’s range of activities result from inadequacies in Polish legislation, or maybe
from the intention to endow the special services with greater freedom of action?
In reference to the above questions, the author puts forward the following theses: (1) the selected and
analysed legal instruments exert an infinitesimal influence on the scope of the application of “special
measures”, such as the operational control or access to telecommunications data. Art. 3 of the Bill of
2014 contains too many vague terms or expressions whose legal definitions are missing from Polish leg-
islation; (2) it seems reasonable that the range of the ISA’s activities has been restricted, e.g. as regards
drug-related crime. However, other areas of the ISA’s interest have witnessed few changes, and its im-
promptu involvement with specific threats and offences is left to the ‘political decision’ of the Head of
the ISA and the Minister of the Interior; (3) the impractical solutions are partly a result of an inadequate
‘legislative culture’, in this case, at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. This shortcoming might be
the result of excessive haste during work on the Bill; nevertheless, such works always carry a political
load, which means that the interests of the services themselves, as well as of the state, played an enor-
mous role in this project.
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Introduction
T
he main subject of this analysis is the range of tasks within the framework of
the Internal Security Agency’s (ISA – Agencja Bezpieczeñstwa Wewnêtrznego)
activities, which is laid out by the Polish legislature pursuant to the Act on the In-
ternal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency as well as the Bill on the
Internal Security Agency (the Act of 2002; the Bill of 2013; the Bill of 2014). In
the first case, the analysis will focus on Art. 5 para. 1–2 of the Act of 2002, while
in the second case, it will concentrate on Art. 3 para. 1–2 of the Bill of 2013 and
2014. While analysing the above legal regulations, it is crucial to highlight their
axiological, functional, and teleological interpretations. The legal interpretation, due
to the methodology applied, will be reflected directly in the analysis of the Act on
the ISA and its two Bills. Moreover, in view of the ongoing legislative process, it
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is of key importance to conduct a comparative interpretation between the regula-
tions currently in force and various versions of the provisions specifying the tasks
of ISA (Cf. Wronkowska, Ziembiñski, 1997, p. 147–179). Apart from the already
mentioned aspects, the analysis should comprise the practices and the activities of
the Internal Security Agency itself.
The questions that should be posed in relation to the analysed issues are as follows.
(1) Towhat extent does the lack of clear-cut frames for the ISA’s activity influence the in-
strumental use of this agency? (2) Do over-generalised legal regulations on the ISA’s ac-
tivities lead to poorer efficiency of this agency’s operations? (3) Does faulty regulation
related to the ISA’s range of activities result from inadequacies in Polish legislation, or
maybe from the intention to endow the special services with greater freedom of action?
The aim of these questions is to point to the primary objective of ISA’s activity (the scope
and range of its competences) – the protection of internal security and constitutional order
(Art. 1 of the Act of 2002 and the Bill of 2014 Art. 1 para. 1).
In the period 2013–2014, we had an opportunity to witness the works in progress on
separate acts regulating the activity of the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelli-
gence Agency; consequently, this text comprises a comparative analysis of de lege lata
(the Act on ISA and FIA of 2002) and de lege ferenda (the Bill of 2013, the Bill of 2014)
regulations.
Within the meaning of the administrative law, the ISA is a government institution
with one-person leadership, centralisation of powers, a reporting line and hierarchical
subordination. The Head of the Internal Security Agency is a central authority of the gov-
ernment administration and reports directly to the Prime Minister (Art. 3 para. 1–2 of the
Act). The activity of the Head of the ISA is controlled by the legislative authority, i.e. the
Sejm, as stipulated in Art. 3 para. 3 of the Act. As regards the Bill, the legislator indicated
that the Head of the ISA should report directly to the Minister for the Interior, subject to
the powers of the Prime Minister as set out in the Act (Art. 2 para. 2–3) (Bo¿ek, 2014,
p. 39–41; Prusak, 2012, p. 119–147; Szymonik, 2011, p. 187–188).
In view of the latest research in the area of security, it has become evident that the
notion of security is subject to a continuous development of its subjective and objective
scope, which, unfortunately, exerts a negative influence on this discipline, even though
it has acquired an organisational legal basis within the structures of the system of higher
education. Forming a discipline, its representatives are making attempts to justify their
research activity by developing suitable instruments and seeking a specific theoretical
and methodological justification. This is worth mentioning only in reference to the se-
curitisation of life and the search for the legitimacy of these actions through the findings
of the security sciences. Securitisation may be exemplified by security of information,
which has recently gained importance in relation to the state’s internal security and eco-
nomic security, not to mention citizens’ safety. In the case of the legislators’ and the
special services’ interests, there often emerges a conflict of interests between state and
society, which results in increasing intervention of the state in the private lives of its cit-
izens and in the further development of various control mechanisms (Rosicki, 2014,
p. 145–154; ¯akowski, 2014, p. 12–14). The above problem will be analysed through
legal measures related to the material scope of the tasks of the Internal Security Agency
in Poland.
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The Act on the Internal Security Agency and
Foreign Intelligence Agency of 2002
The material scope of the ISA’s activity is specified in Art. 5 para. 1–2 of the Act on
the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency (Act of 2002; Cf. Karpiuk,
2014, p. 92–94). The catalogue indicated by the legislator comprises the following tasks.
1) Identifying, preventing, and eliminating the threats posing risk to the State’s in-
ternal security and its constitutional order, in particular, its sovereignty and in-
ternational position, independence and inviolability of its territory, as well as the
State’s protection.
2) Identifying, preventing, and detecting serious crimes such as espionage, terro-
rism, infringement of State secrets, as well as other criminal offences threatening
State security.
3) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes threatening the State’s economic
security.
4) Identifying, preventing, and detecting criminal offences such as corruption among
persons performing public functions, if the said crimes endanger the State’s se-
curity.
5) Identifying, preventing, and detecting criminal offences regarding the production
of and trade in commodities, technologies, and services of strategic importance
for the State’s security.
6) Identifying, preventing, and detecting crimes regarding illegal production, po-
ssession, and trade in weapons, ammunition, explosives, and weapons of mass
destruction, as well as narcotic and psychotropic substances in international cir-
culation, and prosecuting the perpetrators.
7) Protecting classified information and exercising the State’s security powers re-
garding the protection of classified information in international relations.
8) Acquiring, analysing, processing and providing the competent authorities with
information essential for the protection of the State’s internal security and its
constitutional order.
Moreover, it should be emphasised that any additional tasks of the ISA may result
from other acts of domestic law and international treaties. As an example here may serve
Poland’s obligations towards the European Union as regards the Act on the ISA and FIA
that nominates the Head of the ISA as the primary contact point for the exchange of infor-
mation crucial for prevention of terrorism (Art. 5 para. 3; also Art. 16 para. 3 of the Coun-
cil Decision 2008/615/JHA).
The urge for the specification of the material scope of the ISA’s activities results from
the need to identify the legal basis for this special service, which in a democratic state
based on the rule of law seems to be a fundamental legal basis for the functioning of state
institutions. The ISA’s tasks cover a whole variety of areas, which currently, while Po-
land has a dozen or so special services, seems to be a rather controversial solution. The
presence of a large number of special services with a wide spectrum of competences
might, to a large extent, affect the performance of these services, while on the other hand
it gives the state the ability to intrude extensively with implied instrumental use of the
said special services for political purposes and the breach of privacy. On the one hand,
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there is the state’s interest (security, protection, constitutional order), and on the other,
there are issues of the breach of privacy and/or unjustified state powers to dispose of in-
formation on its citizens. As regards the tripartite separation of powers at the general
level, various mechanisms of control have been developed; in the case of the special ser-
vices, whose specific area of action lies at the core of their existence, society disposes of
few instruments to verify their activities. This may lead to mistrust and continued suspi-
cion of the illegality of their actions (e.g. breach of privacy). This clash results from the
fact that contemporary democracies are based on the transparency of the actions of their
institutions, whereas special services cannot provide comparable transparency of their
activities (Cf. Grochowski, 2013, p. 195–207).
The specification of tasks, i.e. the material scope of the ISA’s activity, in its operative
(postulatory) part should provide a statutory basis for the services’ functioning, however,
the above solution gives a considerable range of actions. It is doubtful whether this solu-
tion will bring about the two desired effects, which are as follows: (1) effective perfor-
mance of the special services due to their specialisation in combating specific threats,
(2) combating the uncontrolled intrusion into citizens’ private lives.
In the first case, the great number of services and special services endowed with a spe-
cific type of powers is worth emphasising, which results in a lack of effectiveness due to
the wide scope of tasks assigned to them, as well as their organisational failure. In effect,
the tasks of particular special services tend to be duplicated, e.g. in the field of economic
offences or crimes related to narcotics (Internal Security Agency, Central Bureau of In-
vestigation, and Central Anti-Corruption Bureau). Even if this state of affairs is to be con-
sidered ‘normal’ (in view of the functioning of other special services in the world), it is
still questionable how the problem of co-ordination of actions should be solved. Although
the tasks have been clearly specified, within the meaning of the Act the ISA is responsible
for everything and nothing, which means that since its foundation (formerly, the Office
for State Protection, or UOP) this institution has failed to develop its own profile of activ-
ity. The modifications projected for the year 2015 envisage restrictions in the scope of the
ISA’s activities, which seems quite reasonable in this case. Unfortunately, the analysed
provisions, as set out in the Bill, fail to reflect the above plans. However, the new regula-
tions will remove part of the ISA’s powers, such as combating narcotics and corruption,
which seems appropriate.
It should be also noted that the ISA’s poor performance might result from an inade-
quate training and recruitment system, which ensues from an instrumental approach to
the uniformed services in general and special services in particular. It has been reported
that candidates have attained officer ranking after only a few days of training, which is
a parody of the training cycle, and prevents the emergence of a strong ethos in special
services circles. Cases have been reported that in the Government Protection Bureau
a candidate could become an officer just after 11 days of service, in theMilitary Coun-
ter-Intelligence Services – after 17 days, and in the ISA – after one month of service
(Kublik, Czuchnowski, 2008). It can be concluded that the greatest threat to the ISA is
its politicisation, which is related to a specific ‘HR policy’ that does not take into ac-
count the skills and qualifications of the candidates. This problem, however, cannot
be solved through new proposals, as it is a “problem of political culture” (Rosicki,
2013a).
110 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 3 ’14
The lack of professionalism and over-politicisation, seen as pathologies in special ser-
vices circles, compel us to deeper analyse the subject, especially in view of the special
powers vested in these services (e.g. in the fields of operational control and access to the
information related to telecommunications secrets). As regards the social sphere, it may
affect the issue of the breach of privacy, while in the public sphere it may exert an impact
on the transparency of political life (Rosicki, 2013b, p. 77–96).
The Bill on the Internal Security Agency (2013/2014)
The Bill, as compared to the Act on the ISA, was to specify the tasks of this special
service in a precise way. However, while it pinpointed the ISA’s tasks as regards the iden-
tification, prevention and detection of crimes (directly, i.e. through indicating a catalogue
of specific criminal offences referred to in the penal code and penal fiscal code), its fur-
ther content raises serious doubts.
First of all, the Bill maintains a division of tasks (as compared to the Act of 2002):
(1) identifying, preventing, and eliminating threats that pose risk to the State’s internal secu-
rity and its constitutional order (Art. 3 par. 1 item 1) and (2) identifying, preventing, and de-
tecting criminal offences (Art. 3 para. 1 item 2). In the former case, there is no direct reference
to crimes, but to the circumstances threatening the state’s internal security and its constitu-
tional order. The legislator provided an exhaustive list (numerus clausus) of these threats.
1) Infringing the independence, sovereignty, international position, and inviolability
of the State’s borders (including the espionage, other threats posed by foreign
intelligence services, comprising detection through the signals of counter-intelli-
gence and electronic counter-intelligence methods).
2) Posing risk of a terrorist attack.
3) Ensuing from the promotion of a totalitarian system, calling for the overthrow of
democracy, or the use of violence and unlawful threats, public insult or encoura-
ging hatred towards other nationalities, ethnicities, races, confessions and reli-
gions, or for reasons of the lack of any religious denomination.
4) Infringing the State’s economic security with particular consideration given to
the corporations (Act of 18 March 2010 on specific powers of the minister com-
petent for the Treasury and on their execution in certain corporations or groups
of companies engaged in business activity in the sectors of electricity, oil, and
gaseous fuels, Polish Journal of Laws No. 65, item 404).
5) Threatening the security of classified information and processed data in the elec-
tronic information and communication system of particular significance for the
State’s security, indispensable for the continuance of the functioning of public
administration or the elements of “critical infrastructure” within the meaning of
regulations on crisis management.
6) Related to unauthorised international trade of commodities, technologies, and se-
rvices referred to in the Act of 29 November 2000 on the international trade of
commodities, technologies, and services of strategic importance for the security
of the State as well as for the maintenance of peace and security (Polish Journal
of Laws of 2013, item 194).
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The Bill, as compared to the Act of 2002, comprises a greater number of threats posing
risk to the state’s internal security and its constitutional order; however, in the Bill, the
enumerated threats form an exhaustive list (numerus clausus). It should be pointed out
that this solution only apparently restricts the ISA’s tasks, as the threats referred to in
Art. 3 para. 1 item 1 are represented by vague terms and notions, such as: “security of the
State,” “economic security,” “international position,” “signals of counter-intelligence
methods.”
What is more, the Bill of 2013 introduced categories of threats of a terrorist and ex-
tremist nature. Here, it should be emphasised (and also concluded) that the notion of
“threats posing risk to the State’s internal security and its constitutional order” is wider
than the notion of a “criminal offence.” In the case of threats of a terrorist nature, they can
be defined by analogy to the Polish Penal Code, Art. 115 para. 20: “it is an offence pun-
ishable by a penalty involving deprivation of liberty for the period of at least 5 years,
committed in order to: (1) seriously intimidate a large number of people, (2) compel the
public authority of the Republic of Poland to perform or refrain from certain activities,
(3) evoke serious disturbance in the State system or in the economy of the Republic of Po-
land or of any other country or international organisation – as well as threats of such acts”
(The Penal Code). This means that any deed fulfilling the above criteria constitutes an of-
fence of a terrorist nature. In consequence, such crimes as rape might be categorised as an
offence of a terrorist nature (e.g. while blackmailing state authorities: “if you do not
change your decision, I will rape this person”).
Similarly, the Bill of 2014 maintains the definition of “threats of a terrorist nature”,
which endows the ISA with considerable freedom of action. However, the decision to re-
move the provision on “threats of an extremist nature”, which was present in the Bill of
2013, appears as right and true (Art. 3 para. 1 item 1 subsection c). It has been replaced
with a list of selected offences as referred to in inter alia two chapters of the Polish Penal
Code (“crimes against peace, mankind, and war crimes” as well as “crimes against the
Republic of Poland”). Simultaneously, the notion of “crimes of an extremist nature” has
been removed from the list of tasks comprising identification, prevention, and detection
of criminal offences (Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 subsection c). Due to this, the law has gained
greater coherence and a provision that failed to meet the basic requirements of “principles
of legislative technique” has been removed (Cf. Regulation of 20 June 2002). Previously,
the offences of an “extremist nature” have not been defined in the criminal law (including
the Penal Code), and, what is more, the exhaustive list of offences of an “extremist na-
ture” as referred to in Art. 3 para. 1 item 1 subsection c provided a typification of crimes
not consistent with the Penal Code (Evaluation..., 2013).
Furthermore, the notion of “economic security” raises serious doubts, as it lacks a for-
mal definition in legal regulations, which endows the ISA with considerable freedom of
action in this respect. The above doubts could not be allayed even by the provision that
the scope of the ISA’s competence refers to the “economic security” especially related to
the functioning of corporations or groups of companies engaged in business activity in
the sectors of electricity, oil, and gaseous fuels. However, it should be emphasised that
the ISA did have its competences restricted as regards fiscal offences (i.e. crimes leading
to material loss or offences against the treasury as well as criminal offences causing a de-
crease in public receivables), which is stipulated in the Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 of the 2014
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Bill. The restriction relates to a clearly defined value of the damage or decrease in public
receivables. However, although the above provision does limit the scope of the ISA’s ac-
tivity, in practice, it might be quite confusing to define the type of damage and value pre-
cisely. Simultaneously, it should be stressed that Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 constitutes a starting
point for the request for “operational control” (Art. 27 of the Act of 2002 and Art. 21 of
the Bill of 2014). The lack of a clear definition of crimes and threats “infringing the
State’s economic security” has already been pinpointed as an urgent problem in the arti-
cles in the journal published by the Internal Security Agency (Grzemski, Krzeœ, 2010,
p. 149–156). Irrespective of the above, the problem still requires solving, as it has been
omitted in the Bill.
The issue of economic security is of paramount importance in view of the new chal-
lenges presented by new technologies and financial instruments. Moreover, considering
the ISA’s effective performance, its involvement in two areas of interest should be taken
into account: (1) the prosecution of VAT offences and (2) the protection of strategic cor-
porations and groups of companies.
In the former case, it is worth emphasising the fact that within the area of economic se-
curity the ISA’s main focus was on prosecuting VAT offences (Report, 2012; Report,
2013; Report, 2014), which raises the following question: Is it appropriate that a special
service of a counter-intelligence nature concentrates on this type of threats and offences?
Even if the damages incurred by the treasury were of a considerable value, there remains
the issue of specialisation of particular services. Therefore, another question arises here:
does Poland really need another special service, i.e. a Treasury IntelligenceDepartment?
It would be far more appropriate if the ISA focused on combating offences such as
money laundering and/or threats posing a risk to the functioning of strategic corporations.
For Poland, energy, rawmaterials, and chemical companies will become a priority, as ex-
emplified by the attempt at a hostile take-over of the Polish TarnówGroup by the Russian
Acron company and the subsequent systematic increasing of their joint holdings of Grupa
Azoty above the 20%mark, which allowed them to delegate a member of the Supervisory
Board and access the company’s data (Malinowski, 2014). Another company, KGHM
Polish Copper Inc., may experience similar problems in future resulting from the consoli-
dation of the global copper ore market and the activities of Chinese companies. More-
over, it is difficult to secure the KGHM group of companies against new investment
strategies, e.g. it is hard to assess the financial risk of the functioning of KGHM Interna-
tional Ltd. and individuals in Chile, the United States, and Canada. New threats require
skilled and qualified analysts and a team of specialists trained to prevent economic threats
or to detect economic offences. The truth is that the Polish law enforcement authorities
have failed to fully explain the Amber Gold fraud (a pyramid scheme), which was widely
covered in the media in the period of 2012–2013.
Another problem is the urge to transform the ISA (at least in the plans of the Minister
of the Interior, at the time of writing, B. Sienkiewicz) into a more analytical service,
which would restrict its competences in the field of investigation. This appears a highly
risky decision, even one threatening state security in view of the new types of dangers
(information security, economic security). One of the ISA’s failures is the so-called
‘Vistulagate’ (or ‘tape affair’) of 2014, when illegal recordings of private conversations
of politicians, including the Minister of the Interior, B. Sienkiewicz, and the President of
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the National Bank of Poland, M. Belka, were released (Full recording..., 2014; Zawadka,
2014). It should be noted here that it was B. Sienkiewicz himself who supervised the ac-
tivities of the special services, therefore, in this case, he has learnt the hard way how
important information security is, and what the consequences of a lack of security proce-
dures could be. It also seemed risky (considering political standards and procedures) to
allow B. Sienkiewicz to remain in office as Interior Minister, supervising proceedings re-
lated to himself.
Why mention the ‘Vistulagate’ scandal? Because the ISA is a special service that
bears statutory responsibility for the security of classified information and data in the
communications system essential for state security. The whole process of recording con-
versations between the most important persons in Poland lasted one year at the least; it is
still unknown how many people have been recorded. A special investigation team, in-
cluding officers from the ISA and the Central Bureau of Investigation, has been appointed
to deal with this problem. The fact that the ISAwas forced to seek support from other spe-
cial services does not give a good impression of its functioning as the service responsible
for information security. This means that the ISA, at the stage preceding the reform, has
very poor potential for investigative activities.
As regards the identification, prevention, and detection of offences, in comparison to
the Act of 2002, the Bill of 2014 (Art. 3 para. 1 item 2) presents specific offences with no
description, which seems quite reasonable in view of the above mentioned problems with
interpretation. In practice, it will not restrict the scope of the ISA’s activity, as these are
the same offences that in the previous solution were defined by specifying the damage or
the type of crime.
Despite the fact that the dubious typification of offences was removed from the Bill of
2014, there remains a problem defining crimes of a “terrorist nature”. As an example here
may serve the provision in Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 subsection b stipulating that the range of
detection activities of the ISA shall comprise criminal offences specified in Art. 168 and
Art. 175 of the Penal Code, if they constitute a prelude to committing a crime of a “terror-
ist nature.” Therefore, the ISA deals with instances of the preparation for “generating
a disaster,” “posing a public danger,” “seizing a ship,” “placing dangerous equipment or
toxic substances aboard a ship,” or “generating a communications disaster.” The problem
is that an offence can be categorised as a crime of a “terrorist nature,” only if it is punish-
able by a maximum of 5 years of imprisonment, whereas the deeds specified in Art. 168
and 175 of the Penal Code are subject to a maximum of 3 years of imprisonment.
Operational control and access to telecommunications secrets
The text analyses the scope of the ISA’s activities consisting in the identification, pre-
vention, and elimination of threats posing a risk to the state’s internal security and its con-
stitutional order, as well as in the identification, prevention, and detection of criminal
offences. The above issues are of great importance, as the special services are authorised
to use specific methods and apply specific measures such as operational control and ac-
cess to telecommunications data. The lack of a precise definition of the ISA’s tasks in
Art. 3 of the Bill of 2014 authorises these services to apply the above-mentioned mea-
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sures at their discretion. It should be emphasised that operational control might be applied
while identifying, preventing, and detecting criminal offences that have been specified in
Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 subsections a–g, whereas telecommunications data might be ac-
cessed only while identifying, preventing, and eliminating threats posing a risk to the
state’s internal security and its constitutional order as specified in Art. 3 para. 1 item 1
subsections a–f. Moreover, it should be noted that the legal basis for accessing telecom-
munications data is: (1) carrying out counter-intelligence activities, (2) executing, within
the limits of one’s competence, tasks related to the protection of classified information as
well as exercising functions of the National Security Authority in the area of the protec-
tion of classified information in international relations, (3) acquiring, analysing, process-
ing, and providing the competent authorities with information that might be crucial for
the state’s internal security and its constitutional order, (4) executing and issuing of vali-
dation documents, (5) keeping special types of records (of operational interests; incidents
and situations of a terrorist nature; a list of persons that might be related to offences of
a terrorist nature).
Special consideration should be given to phrases such as: “carrying out coun-
ter-intelligence activities” and “acquiring, analysing, processing, and providing the com-
petent authorities with the information essential for the protection of the State’s internal
security and its constitutional order.” The above wording is extremely vague, which
means that anything can constitute a legal basis for a request for telecommunications
data. Neither Polish legislation, nor the Bill of 2014 includes legal definitions of “coun-
ter-intelligence activities” or “essential information.” This generates a conflict of inter-
ests between the state and its citizens, as the ISA is not obliged to justify the need for the
application of certain measures. In view of these provisions, it can be concluded that the
new regulations have failed to change anything in the new Act – the use of special mea-
sures in accessing data has not been restricted, nor has it been narrowed down to specific
instances.
Another dubious provision is stipulated in Art. 21 of the Bill of 2014 that provides an
opportunity to conduct operational control, the basis of which are the tasks specified in
Art. 3 para. 1 item 2, if other measures seem inefficient or inadequate. Nevertheless, the
said article indicates that operational control is ordered by a court, by way of a decision,
on the written request of the Head of the ISA, with the prior written consent of the General
Prosecutor, if operational control is to be applied to a citizen of the Republic of Poland. In
other cases, the operational control is ordered by the Head of the ISA (Art. 21 para. 4
items 1–2), which results in the unrestricted application of operational control to the citi-
zens of other countries. Such a solution might constitute a matter of dispute, as Poland is
an EUmember state and as such should respect ‘European’ standards of human rights.
Conclusion
The main aim of this text is to present the issues of protection of internal security and
the constitutional order in light of the tasks and the activities of the Internal Security
Agency. It should be noted that it was not the aim of the analysis to refer to all the prob-
lems related to the functioning of the Internal Security Agency – the author has decided to
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select only a couple of issues. In the first instance, the text analyses the Act on the Internal
Security Agency that is currently in force (de lege lata regulations). Subsequently, it re-
views the selected amendments to the Act, i.e. the Bills of 2013 and 2014 (de lege ferenda
regulations).
In reference to the questions posed in the introduction, a number of hypotheses can be
proposed, along with arguments in favour of the latter. As regards the first question, it
should be stressed that the selected and analysed legal measures only in an infinitesimal
way influence the scope of the ISA’s activities, which provides this special service with
opportunities to abuse the powers granted in relation to the application of certain “special
measures,” such as operational control or access to telecommunications data. Art. 3 of the
Bill of 2014 comprises too many vague terms and expressions whose legal definitions are
missing from Polish legislation.
In the case of the second question posed in the introduction, it should be concluded
that it seems reasonable that the range of the ISA’s activities has been restricted, e.g. as
regards drug-related crime. However, other areas of the ISA’s interest have witnessed
few changes, and its impromptu involvement with specific threats and offences is left to
the ‘political decision’ of the Head of the ISA and the Minister of the Interior. A growing
number of threats related to information and economic security will require either
a higher degree of specialisation of special services, or the further development of the lat-
ter. However, the second alternative is arguable in view of the objectives to be achieved
by theMinistry of the Interior – namely, reductions in the number of ISA’s personnel.
As regards the third question, it should be noted that the impractical solutions are
partly a result of an inadequate ‘legislative culture’, in this case, at the level of the Minis-
try of the Interior, an authority responsible for the preliminary works on the Bills. This
shortcoming might be the result of an excessive haste during work on the Bill; neverthe-
less, such works always carry a political load, which means that the interests of the ser-
vices themselves, as well as of the state, played an enormous role in this project, leaving
a wide space for interpretation.
The text does not comprise a detailed analysis of legal measures in the area of opera-
tional control and access to telecommunications data. Another interesting issue is the new
legal measures related to the ISA’s access to special types of information, which is re-
flected in keeping special types of records: of operational interests; incidents and situa-
tions of a terrorist nature; a list of people that might be related to offences of a terrorist
nature. Therefore, it is essential to continue the thorough analysis of the issues concerning
the protection of the state’s internal security and constitutional order in relation to the
tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency – focusing on the issues of informa-
tion security and combating terrorism.
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Ochrona bezpieczeñstwa wewnêtrznego i porz¹dku konstytucyjnego na przyk³adzie
zadañ i dzia³añ Agencji Bezpieczeñstwa Wewnêtrznego – analiza krytyczna przepisów
de lege lata i de lege ferenda
Streszczenie
G³ównym celem artyku³u jest przedstawienie problematyki ochrony bezpieczeñstwa wewnêtrznego
i porz¹dku konstytucyjnego przez pryzmat zadañ i dzia³añ Agencji Bezpieczeñstwa Wewnêtrznego
w Polsce. W tekœcie przedstawiono kilka pytañ: (1)W jakim stopniu brak szczegó³owego okreœlenia za-
kresu dzia³alnoœci ABW wp³ywa na instrumentalne wykorzystanie tej s³u¿by specjalnej? (2) Czy doœæ
ogólne regulacje prawne, w zakresie zadañ ABW, wp³ywaj¹ na ni¿sz¹ efektywnoœæ dzia³ania tej s³u¿by
specjalnej? (3) Czy niew³aœciwy sposób regulacji kwestii zwi¹zanych z zadaniami ABW wynika z nis-
kiego poziomu legislacji polskiego legislatora, czy mo¿e z chêci pozostawienia s³u¿bom specjalnym
doœæ du¿ej swobody dzia³ania?
W zwi¹zku z pytaniami przedstawiono nastêpuj¹ce stwierdzenia: (1) wybrane i analizowane roz-
wi¹zania prawne nie zmieniaj¹ zbytnio, zakresu stosowania “specjalnych œrodków”, takich jak kontrola
operacyjna czy dostêp do danych telekomunikacyjnych. W art. 3 Projektu z 2014 r. znajduje siê zbyt
wiele zwrotów niedookreœlonych oraz zwrotów, których definicji legalnych trudno szukaæ w polskim
ustawodawstwie; (2) s³usznie ograniczono zadania ABWw zakresie chocia¿by przestêpczoœci narkoty-
kowej, jednakowo¿ w innych wypadkach w zakresie dzia³añ ABW w zasadzie niewiele siê zmienia,
a nakierowanie na okreœlony rodzaj zagro¿eñ i przestêpstw bêdzie “decyzj¹ polityczn¹” Szefa ABW, jak
i Ministra Spraw Wewnêtrznych; (3) czêœæ chybionych rozwi¹zañ jest wynikiem niskiej “kultury legi-
slacyjnej”, w tym wypadku na poziomie Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnêtrznych. Mo¿liwe, ¿e uchybienia
s¹ wynikiem pospiesznych prac nad projektami, jednakowo¿ prace te maj¹ zawsze “wymiar politycz-
ny”. W tworzeniu rozwi¹zañ na pewno du¿¹ rolê odegra³y interesy samych s³u¿b i interes pañstwa.
S³owa kluczowe: bezpieczeñstwo wewnêtrzne, porz¹dek konstytucyjny, Agencja BezpieczeñstwaWe-
wnêtrznego
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